This paper empirically examines whether certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the probability of a company restating its earnings. We examine a sample of 159 U.S. public companies that restated earnings and an industrysize matched sample of control firms. We have assembled a novel, hand-collected dataset measuring corporate governance characteristics of these 318 firms. We find that several key governance c haracteristics are unrelated to the probability of a company restating earnings. These include the independence of boards and audit committees, and the provision of non-audit services by outside auditors. We find that the probability of restatement is lower in companies whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with a background in accounting or finance. This relation is statistically significant, large in magnitude, and robust to alternative specifications. Our findings are consistent w ith the idea that independent directors with financial expertise are valuable in providing oversight of a firm's financial reporting practices.
Introduction
Recent accounting scandals at prominent companies such as Enron, HealthSouth, Tyco and Worldcom appear to have shaken the confidence of investors. In the wake of these scandals, many of these companies saw their equity values plummet dramatically and experienced a decline in credit ratings of their debt issues, often to junk bond status.
Many of them were forced to file f or Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection from creditors.
Revelations about the unreliability of reported earnings continue to mount, as evidenced by an alarming increase in the frequency of earnings restatements by firms in the last few years. The widespread failure in financial reporting has largely been blamed on weak internal controls. Worries about accounting problems are widely cited as a reason for the stock market slump that followed these scandals (see, e.g., Browning and Weil (2002) ). Among their many provisions, the new law and the NYSE proposal together require that the board of a publicly traded company be composed of a majority of independent directors and the board's audit committee consist entirely of independent directors and have at least one member with financial expertise. They also impose restrictions on the types of services that outside auditors can provide to their audit clients.
These wide-ranging legislative and regulatory changes were adopted or proposed in response to the widespread outcry that followed these scandals. 2 But Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed in the 1990s, the overall system performed quite well. They suggest that the risk now facing the U.S. governance system is the possibility of over-regulation in response to these extreme events. A company typically reveals serious accounting problems via a restatement of its financial reports. Until now, there is no systematic empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these governance provisions in avoiding such restatements. This paper is a step in that direction.
We empirically investigate the relation between certain corporate governance mechanisms and the likelihood of a company having a serious accounting problem, as evidenced by a mis-statement of its earnings. The specific corporate governance issues that we analyze are: board and audit committee independence, the use of independent directors with financial expertise on the board or audit committee, conflicts of interest faced by outside auditors providing consulting services to the company, membership of independent directors with large blockholdings on the board or audit committee, the influence of the chief executive officer (CEO) on the board and audit committee, and the membership of the chief financial officer (CFO) on the audit committee.
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to analyze the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the incidence of earnings restatements. Prior studies examine the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and either earnings management (e.g., Klein (2002) ) or SEC enforcement actions for violations of generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP (e.g., Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) ). Our paper extends the literature on the relation between corporate governance and earnings management in two ways. First, unlike earnings management, which most f irms might engage in routinely to varying degrees, a misstatement of earnings is a rare and serious event in the life of a company. As Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2001) point out, a restatement can trigger an SEC investigation, lead to replacement of top executives, and result in the firm being significantly penalized by investors. Many restating firms subsequently end up in bankruptcy. Second, the measurement of earnings management is an academic construct; there is no 'smoking gun' showing that earnings were indeed manipulated by managers. On the contrary, a mis-statement of earnings is essentially a direct admission by managers of past earnings manipulation.
Our paper also extends the literature on the relation between corporate governance and SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations. Examining a sample of mis-statements of earnings, rather than focusing only on SEC enforcement actions, provides a larger sample of cases where earnings were manipulated. Given its limited staff and resources, the SEC obviously cannot pursue all the cases where earnings were manipulated. Rather, it is more likely to focus its enforcement effort on egregious violations and high-profile cases that are likely to generate more publicity and so have
greater deterrent effects.
We analyze a sample of 159 U.S. public companies that restated their earnings in the years 2000 or 2001 and an industry-size matched control sample of 159 non-restating firms. We have assembled a unique, hand-collected dataset that contains detailed information on corporate governance characteristics of these 318 firms. We find no relation between the probability of restatement and board and audit committee independence and auditor conflicts. We find that the probability of restatement is significantly lower in companies whose boards or audit committees include an independent director with financial expertise.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the issues. Section 3 briefly reviews prior studies. Section 4 provides details of the sample and data, and describes the stock price reaction to restatement announcements. Section 5 presents our empirical results and robustness checks, section 6 examines other interpretations of our results, and the final section concludes.
Issues

Independence of boards and audit committees
Independent directors are believed to be better able to monitor managers (see, e.g., Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992) , and Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) ).
Firms with more independent boards also have lower incidence of accounting fraud and earnings management (see, e.g., Beasley (1996) , Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) , and Klein (2002)). Both Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the recent NYSE proposals on corporate governance assume that outside directors are more effective in monitoring management.
The primary purpose of the board's audit committee is to oversee the financial reporting process of a firm. The committee oversees a company's audit process and internal accounting controls. In 1999, a Blue Ribbon Panel sponsored by the NYSE and NASDAQ made recommendations about the independence of audit committees. While the NYSE requires each firm to have an audit committee comprised solely of independent directors, NASDAQ only requires that independent directors comprise a majority of a firm's audit committee. AMEX strongly recommends but does not require firms to have independent audit committees. Klein (2002) finds a negative relation between audit committee independence and earnings management. This finding is consistent with the 'impaired monitoring' story, which suggests that lack of independence impairs the ability of boards and audit committees to monitor management.
On the other hand, audit committees of corporate boards are typically not very active. They meet just a few times (usually once or twice) a year. Therefore, even if the committee is comprised of independent directors, it may be hard for a small group of outsiders to detect fraud or accounting irregularities in a large, complex corporation in such a short time. We refer to this as the 'no-effect' story. Consistent with this story, Beasley (1996) finds no difference in the composition of the audit committee between samples of fraud and no-fraud firms. Similarly, even though a typical board meets more frequently than the audit committee (usually about six to eight times a year), it has a variety of other issues on its agenda besides overseeing the financial reporting of the firm. The board is responsible for issues such as the hiring, compensation, and firing of the CEO and overseeing the firm's overall business strategy, including its activity in the market for corporate control. So it is possible that even a well-functioning, competent, and independent board may fail to detect accounting problems in large firms. In support of the 'no-effect' story, Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau (2001) find no significant relation between board independence and the level of earnings management. A third possibility is that inside directors o n the board and the audit committee can facilitate oversight of potential accounting problems by acting as a channel for the flow of pertinent information (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983) , and Klein (1998)). We refer to this as the 'information flow' story.
We examine the relation between independence of boards and audit committees and the likelihood of earnings restatement by a firm. A finding of a negative relation is consistent with the 'impaired monitoring' story; an insignificant relation is consistent with the 'no-effect' story; and a positive relation is consistent with the 'information flow' story.
Financial expertise of boards and audit committees
In addition to independence, the accounting and financial expertise of members of boards and audit committees has also received widespread attention from the media and regulators. Following the Blue Ribbon Panel's report (1999), the NYSE now requires that all members of the audit committee be 'financially literate' and that at least one member have expertise in accounting or finance. The rules assume that members with no experience in accounting or finance are less likely to be able to detect problems in financial reporting. We refer to this as the 'financial expertise' hypothesis. On the other hand, given the relatively short time that boards and audit committees spend reviewing a company's financial statements and controls, it is not clear that even members with expertise can discover accounting irregularities. As earlier, we refer to this as the 'noeffect' story. Third, the presence of a member with financial expertise can lead other members to become less vigilant. If the member with expertise is not effective in monitoring (perhaps because not enough time is spent monitoring), the board or audit committee may actually be less effective. We refer to this as the 'complacence' story.
We examine the relation between the financial expertise of boards and audit committees and the likelihood of earnings restatement by a firm. A finding of a negative relation is consistent with the 'financial expertise' story; an insignificant relation is consistent with the 'no-effect' story; and a positive relation is consistent with the 'complacence' story.
Auditor conflicts
The external audit is i ntended to enhance the credibility of financial statements of a firm. Auditors are supposed to verify and certify the quality of financial statements issued by management. However, over the last several decades, a substantial and increasing portion of an accounting firm's total revenues have been derived from consulting services of various kinds. Provision of these non-audit services can potentially hurt the quality of an audit by impairing auditor independence because of the economic bond that is created between the auditor and the client. We call this the 'conflict of interest' story. services that an auditor can offer to its audit client. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) find an inverse relation between auditor independence and earnings management. We extend their study by analyzing the relation between auditor independence and earnings restatements.
Auditors have long resisted calls to refrain from providing consulting and business services to their audit clients. Auditors argue that providing consulting services to audit clients increases their knowledge and understanding of the client's business, which leads to improvement in the quality of their audits. We refer this as the 'synergy' story.
We examine the relation between auditor conflicts and the likelihood of a firm restating earnings. A finding of a positive relation is consistent with the 'conflict of interest' story; a negative relation is consistent with the 'synergy' story.
CEO's influence on the board
The influence that a CEO has on the board and the audit committee can reduce the effectiveness o f these mechanisms in monitoring managers. The greater is a CEO's influence on the board, the less likely is the board to suspect irregularities that a more independent board may have caught. We refer to this as the 'impaired monitoring'
hypothesis. Concerns about a CEO's influence on the board have led the NYSE to propose that each board have a nominating or corporate governance committee that is comprised solely of independent directors. The NYSE views board nominations to be among the more important functions of a board and concludes that independent nominating committees "can enhance the independence and quality of nominees."
However, it is possible that even if a CEO is influential on the board and audit committee, she is deterred from hindering the board in its oversight by other control mechanisms such as the market for corporate control, monitoring by large blockholders or institutions, or labor market concerns (see, e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) ). We refer to this idea as the 'disciplinary effect of other control mechanisms'.
We examine the relation between the influence of the CEO on the board and audit committee and the likelihood of earnings restatement by a firm. A finding of a positive relation is consistent with the 'impaired monitoring' story, while an insignificant relation is consistent with the 'disciplinary effect of other control mechanisms' story.
Other governance mechanisms
In addition to independence and financial expertise of boards and audit committees, other governance mechanisms can also affect the likelihood of a restatement by a firm. First, large outside blockholders have greater incentives to monitor managers (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Holderness and Sheehan (1988) , and Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) ). Similarly, independent directors with large blockholdings on the board and audit committee also have greater incentives to monitor managers than other independent directors. We examine whether these mechanisms affect the likelihood of a restatement.
A CFO is directly engaged in making and implementing financial decisions and is ultimately responsible for a firm's financial activities. Her influence on the board or the audit committee can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the oversight process. On the other hand, the CFO's presence on the audit committee may facilitate the flow of pertinent information to the committee. We examine whether the CFO's membership on the audit committee affects the likelihood of a restatement. 
Prior studies on earnings restatements
As discussed in the introduction, no prior study examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the likelihood of an earnings r estatement. A few studies examine the consequences of earnings restatements. Kinney and McDaniel (1989) analyze the stock price reaction for a sample of 73 firms that restated earnings between 1976 and 1985. They find that, on average, stock returns are negative between issuance of erroneous quarterly statements and its corrections. Defond and Jiambalvo (1991) They find a significant mean (median) abnormal return of about -9.2% (-4.6%) over a 2-day announcement period. The average stock price reaction is even larger than this to restatements with an indication of management fraud, cases with more material dollar effects, and to restatements initiated by auditors.. Anderson and Yohn (2002) examine a sample of 161 firms that announced a restatement of audited annual financial statements over the period 1997-99. They find a mean (median) stock price drop of -3.5% ( -3.8%) over days ( -3, +3) around the announcement of a restatement; for firms with revenue recognition problems, the drop is much bigger, about -11% (-8%). They also find an increase in bid-ask spreads upon such announcements.
exclude restatements involving preliminary earnings announcements that do not get reflected in published financial statements, and cases where a potential restatement was announced but did not actually occur.
For each case, we tried to identify from news reports the specific accounts restated, the number of quarters restated, original earnings, restated earnings, and the identity of the initiator of the restatement. The restated accounts are divided into core versus non-core accounts, following Palmrose, et al. (2001) . Core accounts are accounts that affect the on-going operating results of a firm and include revenue, cost of goods sold, and selling, general and administrative expenses. Accounts that relate to one-time items such as goodwill or in-process research and development (IPR&D) represent noncore accounts. We attempt to discern t he magnitude of the restatement by examining the number of quarters restated and by analyzing the percentage and the dollar value change between originally reported and newly restated earnings.
For each restating firm, we obtain a control firm that (1) has the same primary 2-digit SIC industry code as the restating firm, (2) has the closest market capitalization to the restating firm at the end of the year before the year of announcement of the restatement, and (3) did not restate its earnings in the two years prior to the date of the restatement announcement by its matched firm. We assume that serious accounting problems tend to be self-unravelling and force a firm to restate its financial reports.
Under this assumption, firms in our control sample do not have an accounting problem.
Out of the initial sample of 303 restating firms identified from news reports, 216 firms are listed on CRSP and Compustat databases. Out of those, we were able to find a control firm for 185 firms. For each of these 185 restating firms, we tried to obtain detailed information on the nature and characteristics of the restatement by reading the relevant SEC filings (Forms 10K, 10K-A, 10Q and 10Q-A). For 10 firms, despite the initial news reports, we could not find any indication of a restatement in these filings. We omitted these 10 cases, leaving us with a sample of 175 firms. Of these 175 pairs, we were able to obtain proxy statements for 159 pairs of firms. Our final sample consists of these 159 pairs of firms. firms, earnings actually increased as a result of the restatement. We could not ascertain the direction of change in earnings in the remaining 8 cases.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the mean (median) level of original earnings in our sample is about $35 million ($1.4 million); upon restatement, it drops to about -229 million ( -$0.4 million). The mean (median) change in earnings is -114% ( -6%). The median restatement involves 4 quarters of earnings.
Panel C of Table 1 shows the industry distribution of our sample firms based on their primary 2-digit SIC code from Compustat. We further collapse all 2-digit SIC codes into 21 industries, following the classification used by Song and Walkling (1993) . 
Stock price reaction to restatement announcements
We obtain stock returns for our sample firms and the stock market for days -1, 0 and +1 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, where day 0 is the announcement date of a restatement. The stock market return is defined as the valueweighted CRSP index return. Section 4.2.1 below discusses the stock price reaction to the announcement of restatements in our full sample, and section 4.2.2 discusses it for subsamples based on the type of restatement.
Full sample
We compute the abnormal return for firm i over day t as (1) e it = r it -r mt where r i and r m are the stock return for firm i and the market, respectively. The cumulative abnormal return for firm i over days (t 1 , t 2 ) is measured as
The cumulative average abnormal return over days (t 1 , t 2 ) is measured as
where n is the number of firms.
In row 1 of Table 2 , the abnormal return (CAAR) over days (-1, +1) is -5.6%.
The CAAR over days (-1, 0) is -4.2%. Both CAARs are statistically significant at the 1% level in 2-tailed tests. Clearly, the market does not take a restatement of earnings lightly.
The announcement of a restatement presumably causes investors to reassess management's credibility as well as future earnings and cash flows.
Sub-samples
In the rest of Table 2 , we present the CAARs for five partitions of our overall sample of earnings restatements based on the type of accounts involved in a restatement, the identity of the initiator, the number of quarters restated, the size of the absolute percentage change in e arnings, and the direction of change in earnings. Consistent with the findings of Palmrose et al. (2001) , the announcement effect is worse for restatements of core accounts than for non-core accounts. The CAAR over days (-1, +1) for core restatements is a statistically significant (at the 1% level) -7.8%; it is insignificant for non-core restatements. Restatements initiated by the company itself or by its auditors are bad news (with a statistically significant CAAR of -6%), while restatements initiated by regulators have essentially no effect on stock prices on average. 4 As expected, restatements involving large (greater than the sample median value) changes in earnings are worse news (with a statistically significant CAAR of -8.6%) than smaller restatements (with an insignificant abnormal return). On average, restatements involving less than four quarters are bad news (with a significant CAAR of -7.4%), but those involving more quarters are not. This is because the magnitude of the earnings restated (not shown in the table) is substantially bigger in the former group. Not surprisingly, restatements resulting in an earnings decrease are bad news (with a statistically significant CAAR of -6%), but those that result in an increase in earnings are not. The difference in abnormal returns between the two groups in each partition is statistically insignificant at the 5% level in two-tailed tests.
Corporate governance variables
The variables measuring the independence and financial expertise of the board and audit committees, the CEO's influence on the board, and data on auditors' fees are hand-collected from the latest proxy statement dated before the announcement date of a restatement. This is done to avoid the possibility of firms changing the structure of their board or audit committee or replacing their CEOs after restating their earnings. 5 If the data on audit and non-audit fees are not reported in that proxy, we obtain it from the next year's proxy statement because these data were not required to be disclosed in proxy statements filed before February 5, 2001 .
We divide the board of directors into three groups: inside, gray and independent We measure a CEO's influence on the board and audit committee via dummy variables for whether the CEO chairs the board (CEOCHAIR), serves on the audit 5 Sixteen of the 159 firms in our restatement sample had made another restatement announcement within the prior two years. Omitting these 16 firms from the sample has essentially no effect on our results.
committee, and belongs to the founding family. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), we say that a CEO picks board members if the CEO serves on the board's nominating committee or if the board has no such committee.
We measure auditor conflicts via two variables: (1) the proportion of fees paid to auditors for non-audit services to total fees for audit and non-audit services (PNAUDFEE), and (2) a dummy variable for large (> $1 million) non-audit fees paid to auditors (LNAUDFEE). We attempt to assess the difference in audit quality via dummy variables for Big 5 accounting firms (BIG5) and for Arthur Andersen (AA).
Other control variables
Data on control variables to measure firm size, profitability, growth rates, and Restating firms appear to have significantly (both statistically and economically) worse operating performance to assets (OPA) than control firms over the two year period preceding the year of restatement. This suggests that a desire to boost reported performance may have caused companies to adopt aggressive accounting practices, from which they are later forced to retract. Both restating and control firms have median 4-year sales growth rates of around 15%. Both groups seem to have moderate leverage. The median debt to asset ratio is about 0.12 (0.11) for restating (control) firms.
Empirical results
We discuss univariate tests in section 5.1 below, Pearson product-moment correlations in section 5.2, matched-pairs logistic regressions in section 5.3, and robustness checks in section 5.4.
Univariate tests
We examine differences between restating and control firms' board structures in section 5.1.1, audit committees in section 5.1.2, the CEO's influence on the board in section 5.1.3, ownership structures in section 5.1.4, and outside auditors in section 5.1.5.
Board structure
We present measures of board structure for the restating and control samples in Panel B of Table 3 . The two groups of firms have similar board structures. The median board size for restating (control) firms is 7 (8) members. The median proportion of independent directors (PID) is about 71% in each sample. About 5% of the independent directors hold 5% or larger blocks of equity (PID5) in both groups. One striking difference between the two groups is in the incidence of an independent director with a background in accounting or finance (IDAC). The proportion of firms with at least one such director is about 18% in restating firms; in control firms, this proportion is more than twice as big (44%). This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in twotailed tests.
Audit committee
Panel C of Table 3 describes the board's audit committee for our restating and control samples. In many respects, the structure of this committee is similar for the two groups of firms. The median size of this committee is 3 members in both groups. The mean (median) proportion of independent directors on this committee (PIDAUD) is about 94% (100%) in both groups. The CEO serves on the audit committee (CEOAUD) in about 2.5% of the firms in each group. There are two striking differences between the two groups. First, the mean proportion of firms whose audit committees include at least one independent director with a background in accounting or finance (IDACAUD) is about 15% for restating firms, while it is 33% in control firms. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests. Second, the CFO serves on the audit committee (CFOAUD) in about 2% of the restating firms; this proportion is about 10% in the control sample. Once again, this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Audit committees of companies that restate earnings are less likely to have an independent director with finance background and to have the CFO as a member than control firms.
CEO's influence on the board
Restating and control firms appear very similar in the measurable degree of influence that the CEO exerts on the board. Panel D of Table 3 shows that the CEO chairs the board in about 64% (62%) of the restating (control) firms. The median tenure of t he CEO on the board is 5 (7) years in restating (control) firms. The CEO belongs to the founding family in 26% (20%) of the firms in the two samples. The CEO appears to pick board members in 80% (82%) of the firms in the two groups. None of these differences are statistically significant.
Ownership structure
Restating and control firms also appear to have similar ownership structures, as can be seen from Panel E of Table 3 . About 81% (84%) of the firms have an outside blockholder (BLOCK) who owns 5% or more of the outstanding equity in restating (control) firms. The median number of outside blockholders (NBLOCK) is 2 in each group. The CEO owns a median of 1.2% (1.8%) of the equity in restating (control) firms.
None of these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. Inside directors own a median of 1.9% and 3.2% of the equity in the two groups of firms. This difference has a p-value of .04.
Outside auditor
Restating and control firms also appear to be quite similar in terms of observable characteristics of their outside auditor. The proportion of the two groups of companies with a Big 5 firm as their auditor (BIG5) was about 89% and 90%, respectively; the proportion of companies audited by Arthur Andersen (AA) was about 13% and 17%, respectively. Non-audit fees comprised a median of about 51% (52%) of the total fees of auditors (PNAUDFEE) in restating (control) companies. About 30% of the restating firms and 27% of the control group paid over $1 million in non-audit fees to their outside auditors (LNAUDFEE). None of these differences are statistically significant. Table 4 shows product-moment correlations among our main variables. The incidence of restatement (RESTATE) is negatively correlated with the incidence of independent directors on the board who have a background in accounting or finance (IDAC), the incidence of such directors on the audit committee ( 
Correlations
Matched-pairs logistic regressions
Because we have a matched-pairs (rather than a random) sample, the standard logistic regression is inappropriate. Instead, we use the matched-pairs logistic regression.
We estimate variants of the following model: The first seven of the explanatory variables are the corporate governance variables that we discussed in section 5.1 above. The last two are control variables. As discussed in section 2 above, the signs of most of these variables are empirical issues. So we use the observed signs to interpret our results.
Panel A of Table 5 shows estimates of seven variants of equation (1) The probability of restatement is significantly negatively related to the incidence 8 of independent directors with a background in accounting or finance on the board and the audit committee (IDAC and IDACAUD) and to the presence of the CFO on the audit committee (CFOAUD). The magnitudes of these effects are quite large. For a firm with at least one independent director with financial expertise on the board (audit committee), the probability of restating is .30 (.22) lower than that for a control firm without such a director. Similarly, for a firm with the CFO on the audit committee, the probability of restatement is .33 lower than that for a control firm where the CFO does not serve on this committee. The probability of restatement is unrelated to the proportion of independent directors on the board and the audit committee (PID and PIDAUD), the proportion of non-audit fee to total fees paid to auditors (PNAUDFEE), and the use of Arthur Andersen (AA) as outside auditors.
In Panel B, we report estimates of four m ore variants of equation (1) . In these models, we include multiple governance variables as explanatory variables and examine several additional explanatory variables. These are the proportion of independent directors who are 5% blockholders on the board and the audit committee (PID5 and PID5AUD), a dummy variable (CEOCHAIR) that equals 1 if the CEO chairs the board and 0 otherwise, and a dummy variable (BLOCK) that equals 1 if the firm has a 5% blockholder and 0 otherwise. In model (1), we include the PID, PIDAC, and PID5
variables, together with the CFOAUD variable and the control variables for firm size and firm performance (LEMP and OPA). Model (2) is similar to model (1) 
Robustness checks
We next examine the robustness of our results in section 5.3 above to four potential issues: controls for other governance variables, inclusion of other control variables, whether restatements denote a serious accounting problem, and the timing of measurement of the explanatory variables.
Other governance variables
We next examine whether the remaining corporate governance variables discussed in section 2 are related to the probability of a company restating earnings.
These variables measure the CEO's influence on the board, a dummy for a Big 5 auditor, and a dummy for large (> $1 million) non-audit fees paid to auditors. When we add these variables to the right hand side of our logistic regressions in Table 5 , none of them is statistically significant; their addition does not change the main results found earlier in Table 5 .
Other control variables
The logistic regressions shown in Table 5 control for firm size (measured by number of employees) and prior operating performance. In results not shown in a table, we also control for financial leverage and growth. Highly levered firms may find it m ore difficult to raise external financing on reasonable terms. As suggested by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) , the desire to raise outside financing at low cost can lead firms to manipulate earnings in the first place. We measure financial leverage as long-term debt divided by either total assets or firm value. Similarly, the desire to sustain growth is another reason that managers may resort to aggressive accounting practices that lead to a restatement of earnings. So we also control for growth, measured two ways: prior four year sales growth rate, and the ratio of firm value to total assets measured one year before the announcement of a restatement. None of these variables is significantly related to the probability of restatement, and their inclusion does not change our basic results. We also control for firm size using variables other than the number of employees, such as sales, total assets, market capitalization, and firm value. The results are similar to those shown in Table 5 .
Is a restatement a serious episode?
As discussed in section 4.1 above, our sample consists of generally more serious, rather than technical, cases of restatements. Nevertheless, the sample includes some cases where firms restated due to reasons that are arguably less serious. One such group may be restatements triggered by the SEC's adoption of revenue recognition rules under Staff Accounting Bulletin 101. 9 Our sample contains 8 such cases. Arguably also, restatements that result in an increase in earnings may not be as serious as cases that result in an earnings decrease. In Table 6 , we report estimates of logistic models similar to those in Panel B of Table 5 after omitting both of these types of restatements from the sample.
The results here reinforce those found earlier in Table 5 . Once again, the probability of restatement is negatively related to the presence of an independent director with financial expertise on the board (IDAC) or the audit committee (IDACAUD). This result is quite robust; it continues to hold when we omit restatements involving non-core accounts in addition to SAB 101 and earnings increase cases.
Timing of measurement of the explanatory variables
In the logistic regressions in section 5.3 above, the governance (as well as control) variables are measured during the year before the announcement of the restatement, rather than before the beginning date of the accounting problems that led the company to restate earnings. The difficulty in using the latter approach is that the beginning date of the accounting problems is unknown in most cases, even ex-post. What is known, however, is the earliest time period for which earnings were restated. One approach to address this issue is to use the beginning date of this period as a proxy for the date that the accounting problems first began. Out of our sample of 159 restating firms, in 109
companies the announcement of a restatement came within a year following the earliest year restated. For this sub-sample, our governance and control variables are measured as of the year before the first year restated or during that year. We re-estimate our Table 5 regressions for this sub-sample. The results are essentially unchanged.
Other interpretations of the results
This section examines the possibility of reverse causality in section 6.1 and the issue of incidence vs. revelation of an accounting problem in section 6.2.
Reverse causality?
We find that firms that have an independent director with financial expertise on the board or audit committee are less likely to restate earnings. This finding is consistent with the idea that such directors help firms in avoiding serious accounting problems. But could it be that better managed firms, which are less likely to have accounting problems, choose to have such directors in the first place? Well, Table 4 shows that prior 3-year operating performance (OPA) of our sample of 318 restating and control firms is essentially uncorrelated with the presence of an independent director with financial expertise on the board (IDAC) or on the audit committee (IDACAUD). To the extent that OPA can be viewed as a measure of management quality, the evidence does not support this alternative interpretation of our results.
Incidence vs. revelation of accounting problems
As discussed in section 4.1, our tests assume that serious accounting problems tend to be self-unraveling and force a firm to restate its financial statements. Under this assumption, a restatement is synonymous with the incidence of a serious accounting problem. Relaxing this assumption potentially complicates our analysis. A restatement can now be interpreted as bad news for investors (by revealing that the company has accounting problems) or as good news (by revealing that the company has decided to clean up its problems).
While this is a common problem with any economic analysis of the causes of crime, fraud or insider trading, this issue is moot here for all the governance variables that we find to be unrelated to the probability of a restatement. But it is relevant for the negative relation that we find between this probability and the presence of an independent director with financial expertise on the board or audit committee. Does our finding imply that such directors help companies avoid serious accounting problems (perhaps by early intervention) or that they help companies hide such problems? The latter interpretation does not seem very likely. Independent directors lack incentives to aid the firm in hiding an accounting problem for two reasons. First, unlike managers who have their jobs (and the investment in firm-specific human capital that goes with it) at stake in the firm, independent directors are not employed by the firm and so do not have as much at stake.
Second, they face substantial liability 10 and loss of reputational capital if they are caught helping the firm hide a serious accounting problem. So independent directors have little to gain and much to lose from aiding the firm in a cover-up scheme.
Summary and conclusions
Following accounting scandals at prominent companies such as Enron, Worldcom and Tyco, there has been a sweeping overhaul of regulations on corporate governance.
First, in July 2002, the United States adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which applies to all public companies with s tock traded in the US. Second, in August 2002, the NYSE proposed a new set of corporate governance rules. If approved by the SEC, these rules will become part of NYSE listing requirements and will apply to most companies with stock listed on NYSE. Among their many provisions, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the NYSE proposal together require that a company's board have a majority of independent directors, that the board's audit committee consist entirely of independent directors and have at least one member with a background in accounting or finance, and restrict the types of non-audit services that the outside auditor can provide. Until now, there is no systematic empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these governance provisions in avoiding serious accounting problems at companies. This paper is a step in that direction.
We examine whether certain governance mechanisms are related to the incidence of an earnings restatement by a firm. The corporate governance issues that we analyze are: independence of the board and audit committee, the use of independent directors with an accounting or finance background on the board or audit committee, the use of independent directors with large blockholdings on the board or audit committee, conflicts facing outside auditors, the CFO serving on the audit committee, and the CEO's influence on the board. We examine a sample of 159 U.S. public companies that restated earnings in 2000 or 2001 and an industry-size matched sample of control firms. We have assembled a novel, hand-collected dataset measuring corporate governance characteristics of these firms.
We find that several key governance characteristics are essentially unrelated to the probability of a company restating earnings. These include the independence of boards and audit committees, and outside auditors providing non-audit services.
Interestingly, the use of Arthur Andersen or another Big 5 audit firm is also unrelated to this probability. We find that the probability of restatement is significantly lower in companies whose boards or audit committees include an independent director with a background in accounting or finance. The magnitude of this relation is quite large. For a firm whose board (audit committee) includes such a director, the probability of restating is .31 (.23) lower than that for a control firm without such a director, after controlling for other things. This relation is robust to alternative specifications. Denotes whether significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in the 2-tailed t-test (for the mean) and the Wilcoxon test (for the median). Table 3 Descriptive
Statistics of Restating and Control Firms
The table shows the mean and median values for matched samples of restating and control firms and tests for differences between the two groups. The restatement sample consists of 159 publicly traded firms that restated their earnings during the years 2000 or 2001, identified using news announcements reported in Lexis/Nexis, Newspaper Source, and Proquest Newspaper databases. Each restating firm is matched with a control firm that has the closest size (market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year ended one year before the year of announcement of the restatement) from among all firms in its industry that did not restate its earnings over the two-year period before the announcement date of the restating firm. .423 a a,b,c Denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in 2-tailed tests. 
Matched-pairs Logit Regressions for the Full Sample
The dependent variable is RESTATE; it equals 1 for restating firms and 0 for control firms. The sample consists of publicly traded U.S. companies that restated their earnings during the years 2000 or 2001, and an industry-size matched sample of control firms that did not restate their earnings over the two year period before the announcement date of the restating firm. Shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are p-values for 2-tailed tests. Marginal effects of the variables of interest that are statistically significant are shown in square brackets below the p -values. These effects are computed as the difference between two cases in the probability of the restating firm being classified correctly out of a given pair of firms. In the first case, each explanatory variable takes the same value for the two firms. In the second case, the explanatory dummy variable of interest takes the value of 1 and 0 for the restating and control firms, respectively, and each of the other variables takes the same value for the two firms. Table 6 Matched-pairs Logit Regressions for the Sub-sample of More Serious Cases
Panel
The dependent variable is RESTATE; it equals 1 for restating firms and 0 for control firms. The sample consists of publicly traded U.S. companies that restated their earnings during the years 2000 or 2001, and an industry-size matched sample of control f irms that did not restate their earnings over the two year period before the announcement date of the restating firm. Restatements that result in an increase in earnings and restatements caused by SAB 101 are excluded. Shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are p -values for 2 -tailed tests. Marginal effects of the variables of interest that are statistically significant are shown in square brackets below the p-values. These effects are computed as the difference between two cases in the probability of the restating firm being classified correctly out of a given pair of firms. In the first case, each explanatory variable takes the same value for the two firms. In the second case, the explanatory dummy variable of interest takes the value of 1 and 0 for the restating and control firms, respectively, and each of the other variables takes the same value for the two firms. 
